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Abstract
Criminal justice authorities of EU countries currently engage in dialogue and action to build a
common area of justice and to help increase the mutual trust in judicial systems across Europe.
This includes, for example, the strengthening of procedural safeguards for citizens in criminal
proceedings by promoting principles such as equality of arms. Improving the smooth func-
tioning of judicial processes is also pursued by works of expert working groups in the field of
forensic science, such as the working parties under the auspices of the European Network of
Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI). This network aims to share knowledge, exchange
experiences and come to mutual agreements in matters concerning forensic science practice,
among them the interpretation of results of forensic examinations. For example, through its
Monopoly Programmes (financially supported by the European Commission), ENFSI has fun-
ded a series of projects that come under the general theme ‘Strengthening the Evaluation of
Forensic Results across Europe’. Although these initiatives reflect a strong commitment to
mutual understanding on general principles of forensic interpretation, the development of
standards for evaluation and reporting, including roadmaps for implementation within the
ENFSI community, are fraught with conceptual and practical hurdles. In particular, experience
through consultations with forensic science practitioners shows that there is a considerable
gap between the intentions of a harmonised view on principles of forensic interpretation and
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the way in which works towards such common understanding are perceived in the community.
In this paper, we will review and discuss several recurrently raised concerns. We acknowledge
practical constraints such as limited resources for training and education, but we shall also
argue that addressing topics in forensic interpretation now is of vital importance because
forensic science continues to be challenged by proactive participants in the legal process that
tend to become more demanding and less forgiving.
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Introduction
Forensic interpretation, that is, the evaluation of the probative value of scientific findings, is a topic that
arises in various contexts and stages in the judicial process. As an integral part of practical proceedings,
evaluative challenges primarily pertain to the particular circumstances of cases, but a closer inspection of
the subject suggests that organisational and academic dimensions should also be observed. Below we
raise these three areas in turn.
Imagine a case of breaking and entering and assault on an elderly woman in her home. At the point of
entry, a large fresh bloodstain is recovered and delivered to the laboratory for DNA analysis. Combi-
nation of a presumptive test and appearance makes it safe to assume that the stain is blood. The same
night, based on the description provided by the victim, the police arrest a man. A reference DNA swab
has been taken from him. The suspect says that he has never been in the premises. At the crime scene, a
weapon is also found. It is swabbed to recover and secure any biological material, including any cells left
by the person who used it. Following laboratory analyses, two DNA profiles were detected, one corre-
sponding to the victim, and the other corresponding to the DNA profile of the suspect. ‘Is this good
evidence?’ is a question that may be found appealing in such a case. Alternatively, it might also be asked
if one could conclude that the suspect is the source of the recovered DNA, or whether the suspect is the
assailant. Such questions may be the result of the stupefying effect of learning that the DNA profiles
correspond, paired with the commonly held belief that a report on corresponding DNA profiles must
necessarily mean something. Discussants may also struggle with the fact that DNA profiles from
different traces corresponding with the profile of the same person may have substantially different
probative values depending, for example, on the nature of the staining and the position and condition
in which it has been found.
For several reasons, it is not very helpful to attempt a reply to this questioning at this juncture. One
reason is that further questions are prompted. For example, when asking ‘Is it good evidence?’, an
immediate reaction is to ask: ‘Evidence for what?’ This suggests that, first and foremost, we ought to
enquire about the actual issue in the case and the needs of the members of the criminal justice system. It
might also be advisable to consider what the person of interest says. Clearly, a case in which the suspect
asserts that the weapon is his, but it was stolen from him a month ago, is fundamentally different from a
case in which he asserts that he has nothing to do with the weapon. In the former situation, the question
of whether the recovered DNA profile comes from the person of interest, that is, a question at the so-
called source level, may be of limited interest only (Taroni et al., 2013). This exemplifies that evaluating
scientific findings in the light of relevant case information is a crucial requirement (Champod, 2014a;
Evett and Weir, 1998; Willis, 2014).
Over the past few years, the importance of sound assessment of scientific results in the context of the
case at hand has also been recognised by expert working groups. For example, the European Network of
Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI) issued the following statement in 2010:
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ENFSI wishes to promote consistent and reliable scientific information through the whole forensic process
from the scene of crime to court. It recognizes that it is of vital importance to interpret potential forensic
evidence in the context of a case, using all available information; reporting results of analysis alone may be
misleading.
The ENFSI Board plans to undertake actions to agree a standard for the interpretation of forensic evidence
and to provide the necessary support for implementing this standard within the membership (European
Network of Forensic Science Institutes, 2010).
This call for a coordinated position regarding issues of forensic interpretation across Europe was
preceded by initiatives such as the UK-based project for the implementation of a harmonised interpreta-
tion standard under the auspices of the Association of Forensic Science Providers (AFSP), published in
2009 (Association of Forensic Science Providers, 2009). This document encodes general principles for
designing cost-effective examinations and interpretation of results of forensic examinations as published
since the late 1990s—the framework also known as Case Assessment and Interpretation (CAI) (Cook
et al., 1998a, 1998b; Jackson and Jones, 2009). More recently, this fundamental understanding has been
restated and thematically organised in a series of practitioner guides, issued by the Royal Statistical
Society’s Statistics and the Law Working Group (Aitken et al., 2010). The practical implementation of
such generic principles encounters several hurdles, however, among which is the commercialisation of
forensic services. For example, in his comment on the situation in England and Wales, Jackson (2014:
16) notes that budgetary considerations may deter a request for an advanced level of interpretation, even
though such a level may be crucial to ensure that the parties at trial will be properly assisted in their task
of weighing the scientific findings.
The instances of organisational commitment to forensic interpretation discussed above are only
selected examples, however, and it is important to emphasise that they are not entirely supported in the
scientific community, as is shown by various opposing opinions raised in scientific literature and
academic debate. Discussions about scientific evidence evaluation have a long history in print (Taroni
et al., 1998), but for the ease of argument, consider a few instances from the past two decades.
In his seminal paper published in the early 1990s, Stoney set out the challenge by asking what made
us ever think we could individualise using statistics (Stoney, 1991), while Evett warned against purely
opinion-based positions when he wrote: ‘Don’t fall for the ‘‘when you’ve been doing the job as long as I
have’’ line’ (Evett, 1996). About a decade later, Saks and Koehler (2005) critisised the fact that, besides
some exceptions in the forensic DNA analysis, forensic science as a whole still largely relies on error-
prone heuristics. They expressed the hope for a ‘paradigm shift in forensic identification science’, yet a
decade later it remains questionable if or when this shift is going to come. This is illustrated by the fact
that it remains common to read statements such as ‘[t]his uniqueness is obvious to anyone who spends all
day looking at medical X-rays’ (Quatrehomme et al., 2014) in peer-reviewed journals, which is in sharp
contradiction to Evett’s quote above, as well as the results of comprehensive enquiries about the notion
of individualisation (Cole, 2009, 2014).
In combination, the above demonstrates the existence of disparate practice and opinions across the
forensic science community regarding aspects of interpretation. This is problematic as it conveys a
picture of vagueness among recipients of expert information and raises doubts about the extent to which
forensic science services can be trusted. At a time when criminal justice authorities of EU countries
engage in dialogue and action to build a common area of justice and to help increase the mutual trust in
judicial systems across Europe, the agenda of the forensic science community should place interpretation
in a prominent position. ENFSI has committed itself to this topic as part of its Monopoly Programmes
(MP), which regroup thematic clusters of projects funded through the ‘Prevention of and Fight against
Crime’ program of European Commission. Forensic interpretation was a main theme of the 2010 MP
Programme ‘Strengthening the Evaluation of Forensic Results across Europe (STEOFRAE)’. In partic-
ular, one of the projects that came under this umbrella, entitled ‘The development and implementation of
an ENFSI standard for reporting evaluative forensic evidence’ (or M1 for short because it is the first in a
16 The International Journal of Evidence & Proof 21(1-2)
series of seven projects), focused on the encoding of cross-institutional understanding about generic
principles of forensic interpretation, the specification of a roadmap for implementation and the provision
of educational support on this topic for practitioners across Europe.
In this paper, we will first outline the key elements of the M1 project, followed by a review of some
commonly raised issues related to selected aspects of the endorsed principles of interpretation. This
discussion is based on the authors’ experience through peer consultations with forensic science practi-
tioners. After a substantial effort towards the establishment of that standard that became a guideline, we
felt the need to take a step back to try to identify the key learning points of the initiative for us. We invite
the reader to consider this a personal exercise, and all opinions expressed are ours only and do not
involve the other members of the project’s core group (see Appendix), working groups and practitioners,
who all contributed to the discussion. They all fuelled our thinking for this paper and we thank them. As
a main standpoint, we will seek to justify the view that addressing topics in forensic interpretation now,
despite implementation challenges, is of vital importance because forensic science continues to be
challenged by proactive participants in the legal process and a general context that tends to become
more demanding and less forgiving (for example, the public and the media). Further conclusions will be
presented in the final section.
The ENFSI M1 project
Background and history
The ENFSI 2010 MP project ‘The development and implementation of an ENFSI standard for reporting
evaluative forensic evidence’ (M1) arose at a time when the need to implement good practice for
forensic interpretation and reporting was recognised, but difficult to address because of very diverse
practices both within and across ENFSI laboratories. Although ENFSI working groups in particular areas
of forensic practice have worked individually on domain-specific guidance documents and recommen-
dations, there was no generally agreed statement from the community as a whole on generic principles to
which forensic evaluation and reporting ought to conform. The M1 project focused on filling this gap,
which is considered essential as it can provide a framework within which community-wide changes can
be enabled with coherence. The major project aim was thus the development of an agreed reference
document regarding fundamental principles of forensic interpretation independent of the forensic area of
application. The project core group, led by Dr Sheila Willis (Forensic Science Ireland, Dublin, Ireland),
was composed of experienced caseworkers and recognised academics from ENFSI institutions across
Europe. The works of the core group (36 months, starting in 2011) were regulated by a so-called ‘Product
development process’ document, which specified key development stages such as consultation in rel-
evant expert communities, the collection of feedback, the revision of draft versions of the reference
document and possibilities to appeal against core group replies on specific comments or requests for
changes.1
Brief overview of the core principles of the M1 document
The overarching aim of the M1 document is to ensure that forensic practice will focus on those activities,
and only those, that help resolve the key issues in the case, save costs for the submitting party, make
efficient use of resources and conform to the criteria balance, logic, robustness and transparency. To
achieve this aim, the forensic practitioner must strive to understand the needs of the submitting party and
the key issues in the case. This requires relevant information, which should be made available or
requested if needed. It is worthy of emphasis, however, that not all but only relevant case information
1. The final document is available at the following links: http://www.unil.ch/esc/home/menuinst/les-unites/police scientifique/
collaborations.html and www.enfsi.eu/news/enfsi-guideline-evaluative-reporting-forensic-science (accessed 24 October 2016).
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is required, that is, information that has a bearing on the sound assessment of the strength of the scientific
findings. In both theory and practice, information became to be recognised as one of the fundamental
ingredients that condition rational reasoning schemes, so that it is considered mandatory to state the
available information explicitly. Further, reports are required to mention that in the event of changes in
the conditioning information, the adequacy of competing propositions, assessments and conclusions
need to be reviewed.
However, once the needs of the submitting party are elicited, the physical examination process may
not start immediately. It is necessary first to assess the extent to which any examinations to be carried out
could lead to results that help discriminate between the competing propositions of interest. This process
of reasoning, known in literature on CAI as pre-assessment (Cook et al., 1998a), places evaluative
considerations at the beginning of the case. This may be of particular interest for cases in which
examinations may be cost-intensive and time-consuming (certain types of transfer traces, for example)
or require an evaluation at a higher level in the hierarchy of propositions (activity level, for example). In
fact, if pre-assessment shows that, whatever the outcome, the strength of the evidence could not be
assigned (for instance because specialised knowledge on factors such as background and phenomena of
transfer and persistence is unavailable), the instructing party may take the informed decision not to
commission any examinations, but rather to review its priorities and allocate its resources to other
aspects of the case.
The M1 document promotes an overall thinking process that directs the evaluator’s attention to the
findings given at least a pair of competing propositions. To ensure an assessment of the scientific
findings that is tailored to the case, propositions must derive from relevant and agreed case information.
In particular, the alternative proposition should reasonably reflect the position of the defence by taking
into account, for example, statements made by the person of interest, as illustrated in the case example
outlined earlier.
Given conditioning information and clearly defined propositions as outlined above, the core part of
the evaluative process can be carried out. It amounts to a consideration of the scientific results given the
various competing propositions and relevant conditioning information (and not the reverse), expressed in
terms of conditional probabilities. That is, it is considered on the one hand how probable the findings are
given both the first proposition and the conditioning information, and on the other hand how probable the
same findings are given the alternative position and the conditioning information. Comparing these two
terms provides an expression of the strength of the scientific results, more commonly known as the
likelihood ratio (Robertson and Vignaux, 1995; Aitken and Taroni, 2004). To enable an audit of the way
in which the likelihood ratio was assigned, the case file must document the component conditional
probabilities and any data that was used in the evaluative process.
The likelihood ratio thus represents an essential core part of the evaluative process, and forms the
basis for the conclusion of the evaluative report. It contributes to a balanced approach because the
findings are considered from at least two competing points of view (i.e. propositions). The likelihood
ratio can be conveyed either by its value or complemented by a verbal equivalent, that is, a statement
about which, if any, of the competing propositions is supported by findings. The reported strength of
support informs the recipients of expert information how they ought to revise their beliefs about the
competing propositions, whatever their beliefs were prior to consideration of the scientific findings.
Document structure
The key elements of the guideline document as outlined in the previous section are encoded in a compact
form with three sections—‘Scope’, ‘Evaluative reporting’ and ‘Standard framework’—covering a total
of less than two dozen paragraphs. The remaining parts of the guideline document, that is, about three
quarters, cover a section with four ‘guidance notes’ and a substantial glossary. The four guidance notes
cover the topics ‘Reporting requirements’ (Guidance Note 1), ‘Propositions’ (Guidance Note 2), ‘Data
and expert knowledge used to assess the strength of the findings and assignment of likelihood ratios’
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(Guidance Note 3) and ‘Meaning of the likelihood ratio in an evaluative report’ (Guidance Note 4).
Despite the extensive explanations provided in these Guidance Notes, and the definitions given in the
glossary, the authors’ experience through consultations with forensic practitioners shows that there is a
considerable gap between, on the one hand, the intentions of a harmonised view on principles of forensic
interpretation and, on the other hand, the way in which efforts to progress towards such common
understanding through the M1 document is perceived in the community. In the next section we will
review and discuss several recurrently raised concerns.
Gaps between intentions and perceptions of key concepts
Evaluative reporting. The scope of evaluative reporting, as it is understood in the M1 guideline, is strictly
related to a likelihood ratio-based assessment of probative value, in the context of alleged circumstances,
and the statement of such an assessment in a communication to a recipient of expert information.
Defining evaluative reporting in terms of the likelihood ratio has the advantage of providing explicit
criteria to judge the nature of a report. The likelihood ratio format achieves this through the following
three key elements: conditioning information, at least a pair of propositions, and focus on the probability
of the findings given each of the competing propositions (Evett and Weir, 1998). Among the most
common situations where this reporting structure arises are those where comparative examinations have
been carried out between material of unknown source and reference material from one or several
potential source(s). Here, the fact that there is a least one potential source provides obvious grounds
for formulating a first proposition regarding the origin of the question material, or the activities that led
to the production of the recovered trace material. To assess the way in which the results of the com-
parison should impact on the mandating party’s view of this first proposition, general rules of logic
require the specification of at least one alternative proposition.
This scope for evaluative reporting—strictly defined in terms of a likelihood ratio—has been
questioned on the ground that, in many other settings where forensic examinations are carried out,
expert conclusions are provided based on what is also called ‘evaluation’. For example, a footwear
mark specialist may examine a mark from a crime scene to provide indications about the model and
make of the shoe that left the mark. Clearly, there is no potential source at this juncture and hence there
are no formal propositions among which the scientist could help to discriminate. Instead, the examiner
would typically offer an expert opinion on potential explanations. In the literature on CAI, such expert
activity has been recognised as an investigative mode of functioning (Jackson et al., 2006). It usually
arises at an early state of investigative proceedings, involving no potential source (such as an object or
a person of interest), and there is no risk that the expert’s expression of an opinion on a proposition will
conflict with the reasoning processes of other participants in the legal process. Such reporting is thus
referred to as investigative reporting as it exhibits fundamental differences compared to the evaluative
setting defined above.
Further instances of forensic reporting that are not evaluative in the sense of the M1 guideline,
described as technical or factual reporting, involve cases where examiners provide an essentially
descriptive account of findings. This may take the form of statements about observations, such as the
nature of particular physical matter, but also the assignment of objects to classes (i.e. classification). For
example, forensic examiners may describe the morphological features of a fibre or analyse powder of
unknown substance to characterise its qualitative and quantitative composition. Such technical reporting
may contain elements also sometimes referred to as ‘(statistical) evaluation’, typically descriptive
statistics for summarising series of quantitative measurements, but this does not correspond to the notion
of evaluation under a pair of competing propositions in terms of a likelihood ratio. For example, the
reporting that an unknown submitted substance is heroin with a concentration of 23% (+ 5%) is a typical
case of that type of reporting.
Distinguishing investigative and technical reporting from evaluative reporting is not meant to intro-
duce a breach in the value of different reporting formats, but to acknowledge differences in the purpose,
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nature of the conclusions and the argumentative grounds to reach conclusions. In fact, evaluative
reporting is often preceded by or contains elements of technical reporting because these provide the
descriptive account of the findings, which is a necessary preliminary to evaluative reporting.
Propositions. The concept of propositions is commonly objected to from several perspectives. First and
foremost, it is argued that ‘dealing with’ or ‘addressing’ propositions is out of the question for forensic
experts as this may impede on their role, compared to that of the competing parties or the legal decision
maker at trial. This would indeed be the case where experts express an opinion on particular proposi-
tions, but this is not what evaluative reporting entails. The document is not giving any invitation to
address what is referred to as the ultimate issue. As previously noted, evaluative reporting uses proposi-
tions only as a conditioning. That is, the focus is on the probability of the findings given particular
propositions and conditioning information. Stated otherwise, forensic experts do not address proposi-
tions as such, but rather the findings under the assumption of propositions of interest. Responses and
interactions in the course of the project highlighted that there is a lack of understanding about the
difference between addressing the findings and addressing the propositions, and this lack of understand-
ing may be the source of some of the resistance.
Related to this is the objection that, in many cases, formal propositions are not available to the
forensic expert, or may continuously change as the case moves on in the process. Moreover, on a
procedural account, the defence may be under no obligation to make a statement. In practice, the defence
might also choose to reveal its position only once the case is at trial. Forensic experts thus consider the
absence of propositions, in particular the absence of an alternative proposition, as a major hindrance for
evaluative reporting. However, this is an operational constraint and interferes with the establishment of
evaluative reports, but it cannot bend the principles of evaluative reporting. To avoid an impasse, the M1
guideline proposes the option of adopting an alternative proposition that most reasonably reflects the
party’s position, in view of the available circumstantial information. Although this might seem as an
invasive approach, it is the only option that can lead to an evaluative report. It is required, however, that
reports specify that any change to the propositions, in particular any new propositions proposed by the
parties or mandating authority, may impact on the assessment of the strength of the forensic findings.
The extent to which this is the case will need to be evaluated in the case at hand and may lead to the
provision of a revised report. Alternative ways to deal with the absence of propositions are the explo-
ration of explanations in an investigative report and the restriction to technical reporting.
The concept of propositions is also viewed cautiously because of its apparent association with the idea
of ‘explaining findings away’—that is, working under a propositional framework is considered as an
invitation to come up with any alternative explanation for the findings. This paralyses the evaluation of
probative strength when the probability of the findings given an explanation is the same, or about the
same, as the probability of the findings given the first proposition, so that the resulting likelihood ratio
will be about one. Although such an assessment considers two opposing sides, and thus is balanced, it
will be uninformative and of no assistance to the court. This complication can be settled by distinguish-
ing explanations from propositions, as emphasised in existing literature on CAI (Evett et al., 2000;
Jackson et al., 2013). Unlike propositions that can be justified on a background of relevant case
information, explanations may be a statement of the obvious, speculative or fanciful, without offering
a reasonable conditioning for probability assignment. For these reasons, the M1 guideline supports
evaluation based on propositions. A mere listing of alternatives that have the potential to explain
findings without consideration of whether such explanations find a reasonable justification with respect
to the circumstances of the case, as is widely done in areas such as gunshot residue (GSR) analysis,2 is
2. GSR analysts commonly report on how to explain (i) the presence of particles even though a person of interest did not discharge
a firearm, or (ii) the absence of particles even though a person of interest discharged a firearm. Thus, whatever the quantity of
recovered particles, an uninformative ‘could be’ or ‘consistent with’ is reported. See, e.g., Gallidabino et al. (2015).
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not endorsed. Further examples for explanations are general statements such as: ‘The injuries are
consistent with having been caused by the weapon found on the crime scene’, ‘The defendant cannot
be excluded as a source of the partial DNA profile seen in the mixture of DNA on the swabs’ or ‘The
shoe mark found at the point of entry could have been made by the suspect’s shoe.’
An important concept regarding propositions is that they can be classified into broad categories,
so-called hierarchical levels (Cook et al., 1998a), such as ‘crime level’ (propositions that refer to the
commission of a criminal offence), ‘activity level’ (propositions about a human activity or a happen-
ing), and ‘source level’ (propositions about the source of physical matter). While the ENFSI guideline
is supporting these distinctions, it also seeks to counter two common misconceptions: first, many
forensic practitioners think that source level propositions suffice, and secondly, many magistrates
believe that moving up to activity level is usurping the duty of the court. Regarding the first point, the
guideline emphasises that source level propositions are not sufficient and can be misleading. Thus,
activity-level propositions should be considered, when (i) factors such as transfer mechanisms, per-
sistence and background levels of the trace material affect the understanding of scientific findings
relative to the alleged activities, and (ii) when the appropriate assessment of such factors requires
expert knowledge. This observation is of primary importance for trace materials such as fibres, glass,
gunshot residues and small quantities of DNA, drugs or explosives. Regarding the second point, there
is no breach with respect to the duty of the court as long as the scientist focuses on the findings given
the propositions, and not the reverse (see also ‘The probability of the findings given the proposition
and concerns regarding data’ below).
Circumstantial information. The common objections against propositions mentioned in the previous sec-
tion, in particular availability and continuing changes as a case moves on, are similarly levelled against
the requirement for relevant circumstantial information. As for propositions, however, these challenges
represent issues of practical application that do not adversely affect the crucial role of information as an
element of a logical approach. A more unfortunate reproach to information, in its more general sense, is
the risk of contextual bias of experts’ expectations and their opinions, a topic that has caused contro-
versial discussion (Buckleton et al., 2014; Champod, 2014b; Risinger et al., 2014). To avoid a digression
to this topic, the emphasis is only on relevant information as emphasised in the previous section, that will
help the examiner to understand the needs, choose the appropriate techniques and assign the probability
of the findings given the competing propositions (Jackson et al., 2013). Clearly, for example, the
examiner does not need to know if the person of interest has previously been convicted or has been
‘identified’ by an eyewitness. However, it may be relevant for the examiner to learn about the back-
ground of the person of interest in cases involving, for example, certain types of transferable particles,
such as glass or GSR. The reason for this is that, under the assumption that the person of interest denies
any involvement in the case, the assessment of background quantities of target particles should take into
account the fact that certain professional activities (demolition works, for example) lead to increased
quantities of target material.3 Similarly, information about timing of events is crucial to help ensure that
results of toxicological analyses are understood appropriately in the context of the case as a whole
(Willis, 2014). Yet another example is selected trace material, such as a small cut of clothing bearing
staining, without any information about the exact location of the staining (on the clothing), its abundance
and distribution. In such a case, the examiner might at best help inform about the source of the recovered
material, but the real need of the recipient of expert information may lay beyond this level of proposi-
tions. Indeed, the fact-finder might be interested in so-called activity-level propositions to which the
examiner’s specialised knowledge about phenomena such as transfer, based on information relating to
3. In the context of glass particles, for example, this can lead to more moderate assignments of evidential strength, and hence more
favourable assessments for the defendant. See, e.g., Curran et al. (2000). To ensure a fair weighing of the findings, it is thus
desirable that examiners are allowed access to such relevant information.
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distributional patterns, may provide crucial insight. While the need for relevant information may appear
obvious in such cases, it turns out that in some jurisdictions budgetary considerations, commercialisation
of forensic services and the lack of understanding of the need tend to limit the number and quantity of
trace items submitted to laboratories, thus hindering vital discussion from being raised in case-based
assessment (Jackson, 2014).
As noted in the above example, relevant case information not only helps direct the attention to levels
of propositions that more closely approach the submitting party’s needs. Appropriately framed infor-
mation can also help avoid analyses being carried out or reported that will add little value in discrimi-
nating between competing scenarios. In an assault case, for instance, there might be little interest in
corresponding DNA profiles if the person of interest admits social contact with the victim prior to the
alleged incident, or claims to have helped the victim. It is not uncommon, however, to encounter experts
who would insist on reporting about corresponding DNA profiles in such cases by means of naked rarity
figures in the order of, say, one in the billions, and accept the danger that such an impression of strength
of support for source-level propositions might be inappropriately carried over to propositions at a higher
level (i.e., activity or crime level). Justifications for such practice are not always quite clear, but stem
from the archaic view that corresponding DNA profiles are to be accompanied by conditional genotype
probabilities, and that reporting of such figures replies to expectations of the judiciary.
It is also worth noting that a number of forensic examiners regard the topic of relevant circumstantial
information sceptically because of a misconception of their role and relationship with information. That
is, examiners commonly mention that they ‘don’t know if the information is true’ and that ‘it might turn
out to be inaccurate in various ways’.4 The misconception here is that experts are not expressing an
opinion about the circumstantial information, nor are they held responsible for the accuracy of the
information. The information is the one that has been presented to them at a given instance in the
procedure, and should any of this information change, then the evaluation will need to be reviewed.
Such a revision is not a corrective action in response to an ‘error’, but a natural reconsideration in the
light of a new situation.
The above observations point out that there is room for improvement of the understanding between
both forensic experts and recipients of expert information that pertinent case information has the
potential to unlock the capacity of forensic findings to add value to the evaluative process. To achieve
this, it is necessary to overcome the widespread perception that sees forensic science as a practice that
can lead to results that ‘speak for themselves’ and carry an intrinsic value. This is not the case, except for
instances where forensic accounts are exclusively descriptive, and hence not evaluative. Instead, it is
generally understood that the elicitation and assignment of probative value requires the specification of
an inferential target, formulated in terms of propositions, conditioned on a background of information
(Robertson and Vignaux, 1998). Further, it should be emphasised that, usually, someone is working on
some version of the circumstances. This may be the submitting party or the scientist who decided which
items to prioritise. Therefore, it is more transparent to make the information on which these decisions are
based explicit.
The probability of the findings given the proposition and concerns regarding data. In his presentation ‘Clarity or
confusion? Making expert opinions make sense’, held in 2009 on the occasion of the celebration of the
100th anniversary of the School of Criminal Justice of the University of Lausanne, Ian W Evett noted
that ‘ . . . the single most important advance in thinking about interpretation of evidence is the notion that
it is the scientist’s place to talk about the probability of the evidence given the proposition, never the
probability of the proposition.’ In forensic and legal literature, the probability of the findings given
propositions has been known for a long time as one of the principles of interpretation (Evett and Weir,
4. A similar objection is sometimes encountered with respect to propositions when examiners argue that they don’t know if a
particular proposition is accurate. See Evett et al. (2000).
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1998; Finkelstein and Fairley, 1970), but experience shows that it is still widely misconceived and
treated with scepticism in various ways.
One major objection is not actually levelled against the conditioning on propositions, but against
probability in general. The objection consists of, first, equating the term ‘probability’ with ‘statistics’,
secondly, arguing that statistics cannot be done without data, and thirdly, concluding that the absence of
appropriate forensic data prevents probability from being used in forensic practice. There are several
closely intertwined aspects in this chain of argument that are worthy of consideration. First and foremost,
probability—understood in a general sense—deals with the reasonable reasoning in the face of uncer-
tainty. Statistics has, indeed, been described as the study of uncertainty (Lindley, 2000), but this is not
the feature highlighted in the objection mentioned above. The objection appears to focus statistics
exclusively on data analysis, which, to some extent, involves descriptive and exploratory techniques
that obviously depend on available data. Although such analyses make reference to uncertainty, statistics
also deal with uncertainty away from data (Lindley, 2000). It arises, most typically, when using data to
draw inferences about competing propositions. Therefore, scarce or missing data, a characterising
feature of forensic science, do not prevent the appearance of uncertainty in relation to topics beyond
data and the possibility of their study through probability as an integral part of statistics.
A variation of the above objection maintains that, without data, one cannot ‘give’ a probability.5 The
suggestion underlying this strain of concern appears to be that probability necessarily requires data, in
particular so-called frequency data, and thinking in terms of near-identical repetitions. This is a flawed
and extremely widespread perception that can be traced back to the frequency definition of probability.6
Practically, this represents a problem because most educational programmes throughout the world
and across disciplines are essentially based on the frequentist approach to statistics. Its relevance for
reasoning in forensic science and the law is compromised on both theoretical and practical grounds. On a
theoretical account, there is a terminological issue in that the notions of frequency and relative frequency
relate to data,7 whereas probability is properly reserved for an individual’s measure of uncertainty (for
example, about a proposition of interest). Clearly, there is a relation between data and probability, but
two are not the same. The former, data, can inform the latter, probability, but the absence of the former
does not mean that no probability could be assigned. Indeed, most if not all real-world events of the
present, the past and the future which entail aspects about which a reasoning individual is uncertain
cannot be meaningfully reconstructed in frequentist terms. This represents an applicability problem for
the frequency-based approach and is one reason why it is often avoided in favour of alternative views,
such as the belief-type interpretation of probability (Lindley, 1991). The latter view of probability, also
called the personalist or subjectivist approach, does not encounter conceptual limitations with respect to
singular, non-repeatable events. This makes it particularly attractive from an operational point of view
(Lad, 1996). Most importantly, probability assignment in the subjectivist perspective is more flexible
regarding the data at one’s disposal. Hence, limitations in the availability of data cannot serve as an
argument against probability, only against a particular definition of probability. A possible reason for
difficulties with this understanding might be that the primary education of many forensic practitioners is
in the analytical science fields, which may direct their attention to instrumentation rather than
probability.
The M1 guideline document addresses the above challenges by allowing probability to be understood
from a subjectivist perspective. This enables forensic experts to base probability assignments on their
full body of expert knowledge. This acknowledges the fact that probability involves more than data (in
the sense used before) alone. For example, forensic experts may have specialised knowledge about the
5. For a discussion of this objection on behalf of fingerprint examiners, see the section on ‘Categorical statements’.
6. For a critique of frequentist ideas in the context of forensic DNA profiling results see, e.g., Brenner (2010). Discussions on
general foundational aspects can be found in, e.g., Lindley (1985, 2014).
7. Frequency refers to the number (i.e. counts) of observations of a particular kind, whereas the relative frequency is the number of
observations of a particular kind divided by the total number of observations made.
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manufacturing process of particular items, such as shoe soles and tools, that is relevant for the assess-
ment of the occurrence and persistence of observable features (such as marks and traits). In turn, DNA
analysts may invoke established genetic theory when assessing the rarity of selected genetic features
(Brenner, 2010; Buckleton et al., 2005; Evett and Weir, 1998), or specialised knowledge about phenom-
ena of DNA transfer in various situations. The availability of such bodies of knowledge for auditing and
disclosure will ensure that subjective probability assignments are not vulnerable to the common critiques
that label them as guesswork, arbitrary or speculation (Champod, 2014b).
Understanding probability in a subjectivist perspective is both an opportunity and a challenge. The
opportunity is that relevant expert knowledge that is not necessarily encoded in case-specific hard data
can be beneficially brought into the process. As an example, consider the case Barry George v R,8 where
the finding consisted of one particle (GSR, a.k.a. FDR in the UK) in the pocket of a coat, one year after
the shooting of the victim. There is no reasonably feasible way to address the probability of this finding
in terms of ‘frequency data’ or to design experiments to simulate cases with time lapses over a year. But
still, there is expert knowledge in this particular area of forensic practice regarding the nature, formation,
quantity, transfer and persistence of particles as a result of the discharge of a firearm. The challenge is to
use such understanding as a basis for the expert’s assessment of the probability of the findings given the
competing propositions, and the subsequent comparison of the assigned conditional probabilities. That
is, the demanding task for experts is to elicit their specialised knowledge and construct a scientific
argument that will allow them to convey their assessment, as illustrated, for example, in the following
transcriptions:
In our opinion, it would be just as likely that a single particle of discharge residue would have been recovered
from the pocket of Mr ( . . . )’s coat whether or not he was the person who shot Ms ( . . . ) nearly a year
previously.9
In our opinion the probability of finding a single particle of discharge residue in Mr ( . . . )’s coat pocket would
have been the same, regardless of which of the above propositions was true. The FDR evidence is thus
inconclusive. In our opinion it provides no assistance to anyone asked to judge which proposition is true.10
Restricting evaluative reporting only to cases where hard data are available would imply that the
scientist retreats to a technical reporting11 that is limited to a statement of the findings in a descriptive
way, with no indication as to how the recipient of experts expert information ought to use the findings to
revise their opinions regarding the competing propositions, as demonstrated in the quotes above. This
would be detrimental to a variety of forensic areas of practice (comparative handwriting examinations,
for example) that similarly rely on the comparative assessment of subjective probabilities given com-
peting propositions and lead to the possibility that the findings will be misinterpreted in the absence of
some aspect of expert knowledge.
Categorical statements. Probability assignment for findings given observations, discussed in the previous
section, receives a particular challenge from adherents of the traditional identification/individualisation
disciplines, such as fingerprint examination. They argue, first, that no ‘validated probabilistic model’
currently exists that could account for the entire scope of forms in which ridge skin impressions come
along, and that could be used in a reliable way to make probability statements. Secondly, given the
inability to assign probabilities, the argument maintains that the accustomed conclusions ‘exclusion’,
‘identification’ and ‘no interpretation/inconclusive’ remain appropriate and must continue to be used.
8. Barry George v R [2007] EWCA Crim 2722 (15 November 2007).
9. Ibid. at [22].
10. Ibid. at [23].
11. See also a mere listing of potential explanations would not be a viable alternative reporting format either [2].
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This critique regarding non-existent probabilistic models is unfounded in the current state of research
(Neumann et al., 2012) and its conclusion—the requirement to adhere to categorical conclusions—does
not follow from it a fortiori if probabilistic models were in fact non-existent. That is, if one could not
assign probabilities, and hence assign no likelihood ratio for the result of a ridge skin comparison, then
this means that, first, no evaluation of strength of support could be reached, and secondly, any stronger
conclusion beyond strength of support—most notably categorical conclusions (such as individualisa-
tion)—cannot logically be sustained either.
Although this might not prevent practitioners from adhering to a reporting practice with categorical
conclusions, the fundamental problem known as the ‘leap of faith’ (Stoney, 1991) persists. This is
unsatisfactory because it is an unscientific position and hence cannot become part of a guideline
document. More generally, whatever one’s position regarding categorical conclusions, the concept of
evaluation as understood in the M1 document12 remains an inevitable logical preliminary to conclusions
that reach beyond expressions of strength of support (Biedermann et al., 2008).
For the above reasons, the M1 document considers categorical conclusions regarding common source
(for example, in the examination of marks on elements of ammunition, handwriting, fingerprints, foot-
wear marks, etc.) to sit outside its scope. The guideline document merely formalises the fundamental
considerations that any evaluator must undertake if the purpose is to assist in the process of inference of
identity of source, whoever is going to make the ultimate decision. Seriously committed examiners
already endorse this perspective by considering their findings (features in a ridge skin fingermark, for
instance) not only from the perspective of the mark coming from a given person of interest, but also from
at least one alternative, such as the mark coming from some unknown person. It is worth reiterating at this
juncture that it is this framework of reasoning that represents the core of the approach, and not the availability
of data, as argued in the previous section, or a statistical model. There is nothing in the M1 guideline that
prevents an examiner from reasoning about the probability of a given general pattern or the probability of
encountering a given configuration of minutiæ in a given ridge skin area without a computerised model.
There is a substantial bodyof knowledge and accepted theory (onmorphogenesis, for example) in the field to
support suchprobability statements.Without suchexpert knowledge, both explicit and implicit, the currently
reported conclusions regarding identity of source could not be made either.
Aversions against the notion of standard. Originally, the ENFSI M1-project included the term ‘standard’ in
its title (‘The development and implementation of an ENFSI standard for reporting evaluative forensic
evidence’), and so does the ENFSI statement regarding interpretation (European Network of Forensic
Science Institutes, 2010). Consideration of the M1 document as a standard has been, however, one of the
most recurrent source of objections, although this seems contrary to the widespread consensus in the
field of forensic science and the law that sound principles of forensic interpretation are an important
point in the agenda of works towards common understanding and a smooth functioning of judicial
systems across Europe. Many commentators even made their support for the final document dependent
on a change to a weaker and less enforcing status, such as a guideline or recommendation. Aversions
against the notion of standard have also been expressed forcefully in literature by classifying commu-
nications on ongoing standardisation works as ‘lobbyism’ and by favouring, instead, pluralistic perspec-
tives (see, for example, Simmross, 2014). Representatives of some expert fields, such as dactyloscopy,
dismiss the proposed evaluative framework outlined in ‘Brief overview of the core principles of the M1
document’ and ‘Evaluative reporting’ above as being incompatible with their existing reporting con-
ventions. The extent of this skepticism at different fronts appears at odds with the fact that forensic
science has no difficulty in adopting standards on a variety of operational topics. Typical examples
include the ASTM Forensic Science Standards13 on methodological aspects of examinations in various
12. See the section on ‘Evaluative reporting’.
13. Available at www.astm.org/Standards/forensic-science-standards.html (accessed 24 October 2016).
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forensic domains. While these are rather technical considerations regarding laboratory practice, stan-
dards have also been issued on evaluative aspects in some forensic areas regarding, for example,
inference of common source.14 Further examples in this context are the forensic standards issued by
the Australia Forensic Analysis Committee, in particular documents AS 5388.3 on interpretation and AS
5388.4 on reporting.15
This apparent inequality in the perception of technical and inferential standards might stem from the
fact that standards regarding technical matters are far more easily adopted, as they require little more
than adequate laboratory equipment and trained personnel capable to operate relevant machinery accord-
ing to predefined standard operational procedures. Evaluative standards, in turn, are crucially depending
on the intellectual capacities of the thinking scientist. This reinforces the view that forensic science is a
discipline that defines itself through the support it provides to other participants in the legal process, in
particular in matters regarding the inferences that may be drawn on the basis of scientific findings. This
is a view of the nature of forensic science that Evett has expressed as follows:
. . . I will settle for a simple premise: forensic science is a state of mind, I mean that whether a particular
individual is behaving, at a given juncture, as a scientist can be determined by the mental process underlying
his/her actions and words. (Evett, 2010: 121)
Interestingly, none of the above scepticisms are directed against the logic of the proposed standard
framework of reasoning. Instead, the disapproval seems to rely merely on an argument to the people, that
is, considering the proposed evaluative principles to be inappropriate because they run contrary to the
majority of current perceptions and because they would be applied to a community that is not prepared or
not proficient and knowledgeable enough to follow the approach. Since the prevalent resistance seemed
to be focused more on the title of the document, rather than its content, and broadening the support across
the community is desirable, the development of the M1 document was pursued by labelling it a guide-
line, rather than a standard. This concession was deemed acceptable not least because the core content of
the document is rigorous, based on sound scientific principles and unique in its final form throughout
Europe. Thus, it has the potential to become considered, de facto, as a standard.16
Conclusions: envisioning benefits and changes
The M1 reporting scheme is based on principles that have previously been operationalised in terms of,
for example, the CAI model (Cook et al.,1998a), reviewed and refined over years and encoded as a
standard by forensic science providers (Association of Forensic Science Providers, 2009). This should
make the scheme both practical and achievable. Notwithstanding this, the field’s readiness to implement
the proposed framework varies across institutions and jurisdictions, depending on limitations in practical
capacities that may represent serious hurdles. This situation is further complicated by the fact that many
forensic agencies face budgetary constraints that limit their possibilities to train key personnel on topics
in forensic interpretation. The core part of the M1 document cannot cover this gap because it is not
intended as a training manual. It intends to ensure comprehensiveness through a substantial glossary and
to provide guidance and assistance for implementation through supporting documents such as a proposal
for a roadmap, an audit template and examples of case reports formulated according to the guideline.
Other budgetary constraints are subtler. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are no recognised
14. See, e.g., Bundeskriminalamt (ed.) (2010) Standard of Dactyloscopic Proof. (Referat KI 32) [translation of: Standard des
daktyloskopischen Identita¨tsnachweises].
15. These documents—not endorsed by the authors—are mentioned solely for the purpose of their general thematic relationship
with the topic discussed in this paper.
16. As an aside, it is worth mentioning that labelling the M1 interpretation principles as ‘European’ is a slight overstatement
because the underlying understanding has previously been supported by scholars from other parts in the world, as far as New
Zealand. See, e.g., Robertson and Vignaux (1995).
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performance indicators for forensic science other than case numbers or outputs. Therefore there is a trend
to increase the case numbers to ‘grow’ the budget. The authors’ own experience is that it may be difficult
to implement the guideline document and one of the constraints is the reduction in outputs that results.
The development of a consensus document regarding generic principles of forensic interpretation not
only represents an ambitious aim, but also comes at a cost. This makes it relevant to enquire about the
potential of the initiative to add value and to lead to net benefit. The main reply to this is to consider the
key achievement of a consensus document that will consist of establishing a common language to define
criteria for a rational assessment of scientific findings. Such a document will set out specifications
designed to ensure that the expert’s reasoning and subsequent reporting is scientifically sound, balanced,
transparent and can be subjected to an audit. The benefit of such a framework is twofold. On the one
hand, defendants will be able to expect that scientific results regarding their case will be assessed
according to agreed principles and not merely by an approach that leaves the choice of the evaluative
scheme to the discretion of the expert (Biedermann et al., 2015). This will ensure equality of treatment
and help avoid vital considerations in the assessment of scientific evidence being kept from defence.
On the other hand, forensic experts will benefit from procedural consistency across forensic disci-
plines. This will enable them to concentrate on the core questions of interpretation, that is, the assign-
ment of likelihood ratios and explaining the grounds for their assessment in the case at hand, rather
than deploying efforts to repeatedly justify the first principles of forensic interpretation. By taking up
this topic now, and envisioning a change, forensic specialists have an opportunity to take a proactive
role in the shaping of a core part of their expert activity. Providing a clear definition of the scope,
nature and meaning of evaluative reporting will help shape expectations among other participants in
the legal process. Thus, at a time when recipients of expert information tend to become more demand-
ing and less forgiving, increased mutual understanding regarding generic principles of consistent
reporting followed by experts should also contribute to reducing the scope of the attacks to which
expert reporting is commonly exposed.
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